Whether vacationing with family or traveling for a business meeting, ease, efficiency, and price make flying the most appropriate form of international travel. Some passengers are comforted by the new security measures implemented by the Department of Homeland Security, while others are now scrutinized by airport security and other passengers. 10 The government has even asked the public to take a more active approach to airport security by paying extra attention to those around them and by observing the color warnings of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 11 The media has covered failures in past security methods for protecting travelers, and it has highlighted the success of passengers in protecting themselves. 12 Passenger, government, and air carrier activism has led to questions regarding procedural limits and legal liability of the airlines in protecting passengers. In choosing to travel, passengers do not know what they might encounter when they purchase their tickets.
14 There are many consequences to one's civil rights in choosing to fly "the friendly skies" over the United States. 15 The consequences to one's civil rights are more drastic when choosing to fly internationally. 16 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 17 more commonly known as the Warsaw Convention, was drafted in 1929 and governs an international air carrier's liability for "injury and damage" to passengers and baggage. 18 The Warsaw Convention is a "comprehensive international treaty governing liability of carriers in all international transportation of persons, baggage, and goods." 19 The main objectives of the Warsaw Convention were to "limit an air carrier's liability in the event of disasters," to "achieve uniformity in documentation for transportation," "to avoid conflict of law problems," and to "facilitate international travel." https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7
While many aspects of the Convention have been modified throughout the years to adapt to modern air travel, 21 Article 17, which states the standard of liability for claims under the Convention, remains unchanged. 22 This Note examines the history and development of Articles 17 and 24 of the Warsaw Convention as they relate to air carrier liability for injuries in international travel. This Note analyzes the evolution and interpretation of Articles 17 and 24, and the Convention's jurisdiction over all international air travel claims resulting in "injury."
This Note suggests that courts, especially the United States Supreme Court, have interpreted and applied Article 17 inappropriately by limiting its scope to only physical injuries. Further, this Note submits that the Court erred by expanding the exclusivity clause of Article 24, thereby preventing domestic laws from providing relief for incidents not fitting the definition of "injury" or for incidents that do not take place on board but take place within the broad range of "embarking" and "disembarking."
Currently, the Supreme Court allows air carrier agents to police international flights with unlimited authority free from suit, because courts have narrowly construed accidents and injuries to protect air carriers from liability and deny relief to citizens for legitimate non-physical injuries.
This Note asserts that the Convention should be amended to allow air carrier liability for damages resulting from willful employee misconduct, including civil rights violations, mental injuries, and emotional distress. This Note recommends that the United States maintain the Convention, but also call for a new protocol at an international conference, as done in the past, to modify liability definitions to appropriately provide comprehensive coverage for international air travel. Alternatively, Congress should legislate greater protection for its citizens by providing multiple means of recovery against air carriers. The Commission asked itself which liability regime had to be adopted: risk or fault. The general feeling is that, whilst liability towards third parties must see the application of the risk theory, by contrast, in the matter of the carrier's liability in relation to passengers and goods, one must admit the fault theory.
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26. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn supra note 21, at 498. See also Weigand, supra note 19, at 898 ("Under common law, the carrier is subjected to a heightened duty of care . . . . Under the civil law system, a carrier's duty to passengers is a strict contractual duty to safely transport."). 29. The holding in Saks defined an accident as an "unexpected or unusual event that is external to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) .
30. American case law has strained to determine what constitutes an accident that takes place "in the course of any operation" or "embarking" or "disembarking." The courts have not been uniform in construing "in the course of . . . embarking and disembarking" as used in Article 17, due perhaps to the ambiguous history of the Convention and the changes in air transportation technology since the original drafting. 1 AVIATION TORT AND REG. LAW § 11:25. There are three factors which are relevant in determining liability under Article 17 within the scope of "embarking" or "disembarking": (1) location of the accident; (2) the activity in which the injured person was engaging; and (3) the control by defendant of such injured person at the location and during the activity taking place at the time of the accident alleged to be in the course of any of the operations of embarking, and bear significantly Air carriers benefited from the Warsaw Convention because their liability was limited to approximately $8,300 United States dollars at the time. 32 The only concessions the Convention gave to passengers were Articles 23 and 20. 33 Article 23 rendered null and void any additional provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a limit lower than the one provided in its text. "Article 20 shifted the burden of proof to the carrier, who was required to show that it had taken all necessary measures to avoid damages." 34 The Convention entered into force in February 1933. 35 32. The Warsaw Convention was written in French, and it used French currency in determining the liability limit. The limit was 125,000 "Poincare francs," which was low even in 1929, so airlines could flourish and to prevent bankruptcy in case of a single catastrophic accident. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 499-500.
33. "Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the provisions of this convention." Supra note 17.
34.
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage. Id. This standard shifted the burden of proof to the air carrier, which was seen as a balance to the low liability limit. Because passengers would be limited in recovery, they would have a concession for not having the burden to prove the fault of the air carrier, unless the carrier could demonstrate that all reasonable steps were taken. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 500.
35. According to Article 37, the Warsaw Convention would become effective ninety days after ratification by five of the High Contracting Parties; Spain, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Romania signed initially, followed by France, Poland, and Latvia all on November 15, 1932, and the Convention entered into force on February 13, 1933. Great Britain and Italy ratified it on the following day, and by the end of 1933 twelve countries were members. [T]he principle of limitation of liability will not only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but . . . it will prove to be an aid in the development of international air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportation charges.
38
The United States "deposited its instrument of adherence" to the Warsaw Convention on July 31, 1934, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed it ninety days later.
THE PROTOCOLS
The Warsaw Convention was not perfect. Around the world, critics immediately debated the merits of the low liability limit benefiting the air carriers. 40 A diplomatic conference commenced at The Hague in September of 1955 to discuss amending the Convention. 41 Arguments were made to raise the carrier liability limit in Article 22 and to modify the willful misconduct standard in Article 25. 42 The United States sought to increase the limit on carrier's ordinary negligence liability to $25,000, but settled for $16,600. 43 The United States did not originally sign The Hague Protocol but did so on June 28, 1956. The Montreal Convention also includes the following new elements:
(1) In cases of aircraft accidents, air carriers are called upon to provide advance payments without delay to assist entitled persons in meeting immediate economic needs with the amount of this initial payment subject to natural law and deductible from the final settlement; (2) The air carriers must submit proof of insurance, thereby ensuring the availability of financial resources in cases of automatic payments or litigation; (3) Legal action for damages resulting from the death or injury of a passenger may be filed in the country where, at the time of the accident, the passenger had his or her principal and permanent residence, subject to certain conditions; (4) Facilitation in the recovery of damages without the need for lengthy litigation; and (5) Simplification and modernization of documentation related to passengers, baggage, and cargo.
[VOL. 55. Lowenfeld, supra note 21. The Supreme Court defined an "accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger," and further held that an "accident" cannot result from "the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft." Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7 "willful misconduct" as referenced in Article 25. 57 [VOL. 7:161
Court defined "accident" and clarified that an incident must occur in order to cause the injury and the incident must be unexpected, but the Court failed to address which types of injuries would be actionable under the Convention.
65
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court defined "injury" under Article 17 to limit air carriers' liability to an injury with a physical manifestation in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd. 66 In Floyd, 67 the Supreme Court considered the documentary records of the Warsaw Convention along with court commentators to conclude that the Convention did not consider liability for psychic injury or a broad interpretation of "lésion corporelle."
68 The Court noted the French term's English translation and the drafters' intentions, due to the fact that most were from civil law countries. 69 The Court concluded that Article 17 did not allow recovery "when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury." 70 The Court did not make a determination about a passenger's ability to recover for mental injuries accompanying physical injuries. 72 A flight attendant refused three times to move an asthmatic passenger further away from the smoking section, even though the plaintiff knew before boarding that smoking was permitted on the flight. 73 Yet, he chose to board the aircraft and remain in his seat. 74 He was informed that he was free to request another passenger to switch seats with him, as a seat change was not to be effected by the Olympic flight attendant. 75 However, the lower court found that the flight attendant's failure to move the passenger to a different non-smoking seat further away from the smoking section of the aircraft violated the carrier's procedures and industry standards, constituted an "accident," and also demonstrated the carrier's willful misconduct, which allowed for higher monetary recovery. 76 The Supreme Court held that this conduct constituted an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
77
It concluded that the flight attendant's failure to act was an unexpected or unusual event and held in plaintiff's favor. 78 The Supreme Court held that the "accident" definition should be flexibly applied after assessing all circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries. However, the Court did not expand its definition of "injury" noting that the flexibility standard was only with regard to "accident" and not "injury" itself. 79 Relying on Saks, the Court determined that at a minimum, an accident can be an "event" or "happening," and that inaction can constitute an "accident." 80 The Court explained that liability presented with a proposal to amend Article 17 to cover purely mental injuries. The Greek delegation proposed adding the word 'mental' to Article 17 because it was not clear whether Article 17 allowed recovery for such injury"). The Court did not consider this intention because it said it could not "infer much from that fact. by replacing "willful misconduct" with the language "done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result, as long as the airline's employee or agent was acting within the scope of employment". The Protocol entered into force after the events of Husain; therefore, the Protocol was not considered in that case.
83. The Erhlich Court and other courts have struggled with Article 17. Infra note 84. In Prescod, 383 F.3d 861, personnel took Ms. Neischer's carry-on bag containing her medication, the later mishandling of which led to her death. The court held that the seizure of the carry-on bag was an "accident" under Article 17, id. at 868, and constituted "willful misconduct" under Article 25. Id. at 870. The willful misconduct determination is based on a subjective standard and can be satisfied through circumstantial evidence. Id. "Neischer was repeatedly promised action that was or should have been within the defendants' power to deliver". . . . The act was intentionally done and was of "an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known or so obvious that it must have been taken aware of it," which resulted in harm. Therefore, it was willful misconduct. 86. Id. at 400. ("The government's interpretation of Article 17 is faithful to the Warsaw Convention's text, negotiating history, purposes, and the judicial decision of sister Convention signatories; as such, we ascribe 'great weight' to the government's views concerning the meaning of that provision.") Lower courts are also defining Article 17 terms that the Supreme Court has not addressed, but they give greater weight to the interpretations that the government, as a signatory, gave to the Convention than to higher court's interpretations.
A California district court further examined Article 17's test for allowance of mental injuries in In re Crash at Tapei. 87 The court concluded that plaintiffs could only recover for psychological injuries that are caused by bodily injury, and even a development of post-traumatic stress disorder did not per se qualify for recovery even though the disorder has physical effects. 88 Lower courts have considered the applicability of injuries that did not take place on board an aircraft but rather during embarkation. 89 In Hansen v. Delta Air Lines, 90 a Delta employee reported that Ms. Hansen said "bomb," which led to her arrest at the boarding gate in Chicago en route to Manchester, England.
91 She and her husband had received their boarding passes, cooperated with all requests and questions of Delta employees, and proceeded through security. 92 When she and her husband reached the boarding line for their flight, they were arrested and transported to a Chicago Police station, where the police searched, photographed, handcuffed, and jailed Ms. Hansen.
93
Ms. Hansen filed a claim against Delta for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 88. Specifically, the Court concluded:
(1) plaintiffs may not recover in cases where the only injury suffered is a psychological injury; (2) plaintiffs may not recover for psychological injuries that accompany, but are not caused by bodily injury; (3) plaintiffs may recover for mental or psychological injuries caused by physical injuries suffered in an air crash; (4) plaintiffs may not recover for physical manifestations of psychological injuries unless the underlying psychological injury was caused by a bodily injury; and (5) a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), without more, does not satisfy the bodily injury requirement of Article 17. Plaintiffs may recover for PTSD that resulted from a bodily injury, including an actual physical injury to the brain. However, plaintiffs may not recover for PTSD that resulted from the stress of the accident, even if the PTSD, in turn, resulted in physical changes to the brain or other physical manifestations.
Id.
89 [VOL. 7:161 passenger's location at the time of the injury; (2) the passenger's activity at the time of the injury; and (3) the degree of control the airline was exercising over the passenger when the injury occurred.
96
The court could not determine whether or not Ms. Hansen was "embarking" because the facts lacked specificity with respect to the plaintiff's distance from the gate, her proximity to the Delta controlled gate area, and her actions at the time of her arrest with relation only to the act of boarding.
97 Such expansive readings of "embarking" and "disembarking" have consequences for "injury," because being arrested while in the gate area has physical characteristics not necessarily implicated while sitting on a plane. The court failed to further inquire as to Ms. Hansen's "injury," but the circumstances clearly indicate that the applicability can be expansive while the burden is overwhelmingly high on the part of the passenger to prove that he or she was injured, that he or she was not within the scope of the Convention, and that the air carrier acted with willful misconduct. 98 Further, the expansion to events that occur outside or during security checkpoints creates a scope far outside passenger expectations. The Warsaw Convention extends to the first location of embarkation, including domestic flights when a passenger's final destination is international, until final arrival through security.
99
Courts in jurisdictions throughout the world have faced similar problems surrounding Article 17. 100 In Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, a 15-year old girl awoke during the flight to find a male passenger caressing her thigh. 101 She sought recovery for clinical depression which was a result of the incident by the male passenger, but the House of Lords in Britain rejected the claim because there was no "physical injury" even though the passenger touched her. 98. Id. The Convention was intended to give the benefit of the proof standards to the passenger and force the air carrier to defend itself, but the case here demonstrates that when the facts are in dispute the passenger is not given the benefit because the air carrier can prove exclusivity more expansively while the passenger has a very narrow construction of injury to demonstrate. See https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7 degraded" and his "dignity was severely impaired" when a flight attendant approached him and his partner, demanding that they "not kiss each other as doing so was offensive to other passengers on the flight." 104 The Court held that the Warsaw Convention was the sole basis upon which the plaintiff could seek relief. However, because the air carrier was not liable for any conduct not resulting in a physical injury, he did not state a recognized "injury" under the Warsaw Convention. 105. Plaintiff's main cause of action relied on defendant's breach of contract and an alternative cause of action was based on the acto iniuriarum. Defendant filed an exception to plaintiff's claim which was based upon the proposition that the Warsaw Convention provided the exclusive cause of action and sole remedy for a passenger who claims for loss, injury and damages sustained in the course, or arising out, of his international carriage. The High Court of South Africa agreed with defendant and held that because plaintiff's main and alternative causes of action were not based on the Warsaw Convention, they could not be sustained in law. In addition, because plaintiff did not allege death, wounding or other bodily injury suffered by him as a result of an accident, the defendant could not be liable in terms of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
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106. A similar incident to Potgeiter occurred on an American Airlines flight from Paris to New York City. Gay males were labeled "offensive" and were prohibited from actions which are generally accepted for heterosexual couples. [VOL. 7:161
The Supreme Court in Tseng analyzed Article 24's exclusivity clause. 109 The Court considered the Convention in light of its drafting history. It concluded that the Convention is the exhaustive remedy for injuries on international flights, due to the goal of creating uniformity in international travel laws. 110 The Court held that Article 24 created an exclusive cause of action for air carrier liability. It rejected the plaintiff's argument that when a passenger's personal injury suit does not satisfy the liability conditions of Article 17, this passenger is able to pursue them under local law.
111
Based on Tseng, any incident that harms a passenger while aboard, embarking, or disembarking an international flight will be governed by the Warsaw Convention and the various protocols.
112 Air carrier liability is limited not only by the monetary limit, but more importantly, by the courts' interpretation of "injury." Though passengers are entitled to monetary relief from physical injuries, no interpretations or amendments protect citizens suffering injuries from an air carrier's willful misconduct resulting in mental injury. 113 The result allows discrimination, racial profiling and harm to passenger civil rights, and other incidents causing passengers mental injuries and emotional distress. 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERPRETATIONS
There is a disconnect in the Supreme Court's interpretations of the purpose and scope of the Warsaw Convention. 115 While the Court has concluded that the intentions behind the Convention are open to interpretation because it is a treaty, the Court has chosen mutually exclusive interpretations. 116 The Court has determined that the Warsaw Convention was intended to be a widespread and sweeping treaty governing all injuries on international flights. 117 However, the Court has also determined that the Convention does not govern all injuries suffered on international travel, because it is only supposed to address injuries with physical manifestations.
118 Yet, with lower courts' broad interpretations of "embarking" and "disembarking" to include incidents not physically in the aircraft and to extend as far as security screenings, 119 the United States courts have created complete exclusivity of the Convention 120 without exceptions for the new invasive post 9/11 security tactics. 121 The Court has 115. The Supreme Court held in Tseng that "the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention," id. at 176, because the Warsaw Convention was created to unify the laws governing international air travel. However, the Court previously held in Saks that the Convention could not be stretched to cover injuries that are not caused by accidents. Id. If the Convention was drafted specifically to cover injuries caused by accidents, it cannot possibly account for all misconduct by airline employees, including racial profiling and discrimination. See supra note 58.
116. Whenever possible, interpretations of a treaty that produce anomalous or illogical results should be avoided. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 157. 117. Id. at 176. 118. Id. 119. Id. "Embarking" and "disembarking" are determined in view of the total circumstances surrounding the incident in question with particular emphasis on location, activity, control, and immediacy of the flight. "Embarking" is not limited to the time after the ticket has been collected and honored for travel and the passenger have passed through the gate check where the boarding stub is given as suggested in Marotte v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F. given a license to flight attendants, crew, and airline personnel to become judges within their international flight jurisdiction.
We do not know the array of incidents that have caused injuries for passengers because the courts have shut the door on air carrier liability. The process of judicial review cannot be relied upon to advance rights, because so many of the cases are dismissed or not brought because of the limited definition of Article 17 and the expansion of Article 24.
Freedoms are defended in the courts, but when there are no freedoms to be had on international flights the courts give legitimacy to invasive procedures, morality judgments, and discrimination by air carriers. Recent news stories clearly illustrate outrageous conduct by air carrier personnel in the interest of airline security. 122 In Spain, airline personnel demanded that a law professor allow his carry-on baggage to be searched by fellow passengers because those fellow passengers were uncomfortable because "he looked like a terrorist."
123 In Australia, a man was prevented from flying because he was wearing a shirt that said, "George Bush is a terrorist." 124 In the United States, two gay men were told by a flight attendant that their behavior, described to be "kissing," was disturbing to other passengers and creating a security risk. 125 The crew, including the pilot, threatened the men with prosecution.
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The Warsaw Convention, as currently interpreted, provides passengers with no means of recovery for these incidents. Although these passengers perhaps have domestic law claims ranging from Equal Protection, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress to invasion of privacy, these injuries are not sufficient to allow for recovery. At the same time, the Convention is their only means of recovery due to Article 24's exclusivity clause because the incidents took place within the scope of international travel. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7
Courts will not be able to hear cases which could cause legitimate harm to individuals. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and constitutional doctrines such as standing, mootness, and ripeness can relieve strain on the courts, citizens who suffer non-physical damage under the Convention will not be allowed to have their day in court. Air carriers have an important role in providing security for passengers on international travel; however, actions under the guise of security measures should not permit their outrageous conduct.
CHANGES NECESSARY TO PROTECT PASSENGERS
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the Convention's scope and limited its liability so that passengers who suffer very real injuries such as psychic episodes, 127 search and seizure violations, 128 and civil rights violations 129 are left with no forum for justice. Judicial activism is not the answer to the Convention's problems: Congress must change the Convention's applicability.
The Warsaw Convention is a validly ratified international treaty, so it is equivalent to a federal statute. 130 When a conflict arises between a treaty and a congressional statute, the one later enacted is controlling. 131 Therefore, Congress should override the Warsaw Convention by enacting a new statute, which would conflict with the Convention.
132
The Convention, which was intended to protect air carriers from catastrophes, is now protecting air carriers from all liability, including its crew's willful misconduct. 133 The Court allows flight attendants to determine appropriate measures, short of physical injury, to regulate passengers on international flights.
134 Domestic laws provide no relief to passengers, 135 and therefore, changes are needed to the Convention.
CONCLUSION
The Convention was created during international air travel's infancy, when air carriers needed protection from bankruptcy in case of a crash or other disaster. The modern era of flight has changed the need for the Convention altogether. Large companies and their alliances do not need liability protection to the extent provided by the Supreme Court.
The United States, for its part in protecting citizens by raising liability limits, should not simply write off the Convention as has been suggested by some scholars. In order to protect its own citizens to the best extent possible, the United States should call for a new protocol to the Convention to ensure protection and allow for passengers to rightfully recover for real injuries suffered. Congress could also take the initiative to override the Convention's applicability by enacting new legislation. The role of international travel in modern society will not decrease, and with the modernization of airports, aircraft, and security measures, law must be modernized in order to best protect citizens' rights.
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